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In 1997 I wrote that "[p]unitive damages are . .. rapidly
disappearing from maritime personal injury law, and it is hard to see
how they can long survive in property damage cases."' It turns out
this was a premature obituary. The United States Supreme Court's
2008 decision in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker upheld an award of
maritime punitive damages to commercial fishermen suing an ocean
polluter for loss of livelihood,2 and the brand new decision in
Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend has now held that injured
seamen are entitled to seek punitive damages against employers who
willfully or wantonly flout their obligation to provide maintenance
(room and board) and cure (medical care).3 This Article will explore
this unfolding maritime punitive damages story.
II. BACKGROUND: FIvE CONCEPTUAL AND ANALYTICAL TOOLS
Understanding this Article will be eased and enriched by
reviewing the following five concepts.
A. The Seaman 's Trilogy
Under general maritime law, ill and injured seamen have a
4
"trilogy" of rights against shipowners and employers. First, when aseaman falls ill or is injured while in the service of the ship, the
Copyright 2010, by DAvID W. ROBERTSON.
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1. David W. Robertson, Punitive Damages in American Maritime Law, 28 J.
MAR. L. & COM. 73, 163 (1997).
2. 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008).
3. 129 S. Ct. 2561 (2009).
4. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 354 (1995).
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seaman's employer immediately owes the seaman maintenance
(room and board) and cure (medical care).5 If the employer fails to
honor these obligations, the seaman can sue to recover what is due.
If the employer's failure is negligent and causes the seaman to
sustain additional injury, illness, or pain, the seaman can recover
compensatory damages. If the employer's failure was more
egregious than that, traditionally the seaman could additionally
recover attorneys' fees and punitive damages.
6
Second, when a seaman is injured by the operational unfitness of
the ship, the seaman can sue in tort for unseaworthiness. Like the
right to maintenance and cure, the right to sue for unseaworthiness
emanates from general (nonstatutory) maritime law.7
Third, when a seaman is injured by workplace negligence, the
seaman has a statutory cause of action in tort against the employer
under the Jones Act.
8
Historically, conceptually, and functionally, the unseaworthiness
and Jones Act tort actions are "Siamese twins."9 The much older
maintenance and cure action does not derive from tort principles and
is something like a first cousin to the other two.'
0
B. The Distinction Between Compensatory and Punitive Damages
This Article draws a clean distinction between compensatory
damages and punitive damages. Compensatory damages aim at
reimbursing losses. Punitive damages aim at punishing
reprehensible behavior, teaching the Verpetrator not to do it again,
and admonishing others never to do it. 1
C. The Distinction Between Pecuniary Compensatory Damages and
Non-Pecuniary Compensatory Damages
In traditional damages analysis, compensatory damages fall into
two subcategories. Pecuniary compensatory damages are those that
5. See FRANK L. MARAIST & THOMAS C. GALLIGAN, JR., ADMIRALTY IN A
NUTSHELL 209-10 (5th ed. 2005).
6. Morales v. Garijak, Inc., 829 F.2d 1355, 1358 (5th Cir. 1987).
7. MARAIST & GALLIGAN, supra note 5, at 222.
8. 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006).
9. GRANT GiLMoRE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY
383 (2d ed. 1975).
10. See O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36, 42
(1943) ("[T]he seaman's right [to maintenance and cure] was firmly established in
the maritime law long before recognition of the distinction between tort and
contract.").
11. Robertson, supra note 1, at 75, 80-81.
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are measurable in money, at least notionally. In personal injury
cases, the standard pecuniary categories of compensatory damages
are lost earnings and earning capacity and medical and related
expenses. In wrongful death litigation, the standard pecuniary
categories of compensatory damages are loss of support and loss of
services.
Non-pecuniary compensatory damages are those that are not
measurable in money, although courts award money to assuage the
losses. In personal injury cases, the non-pecuniary categories of
compensatory damages are pain and suffering and hedonic (loss of
enjoyment of life) damages. In wrongful death cases, the standard
non-pecuniary category of compensatory damages is loss of society
(companionship, consortium). 12
D. The Two Types of Fatal-Injury Litigation
The distinction between two types of fatal-injury litigation is
basic in tort law, but it is often confused or elided. Wrongful death
actions seek to recover the victim's family's losses."- Survival
actions seek to recover on behalf of the victim's estate "whatever..
.the deceased . . .would have . . . been able to sue [for] at the
moment of ... death-for example, for his pain and suffering, loss
of wages, and medical expenses between the time of injury and
death." 4
E. The Distinction Between Causes ofAction and Remedies
Finally, this Article draws a clean distinction between causes of
action and remedies. In simple terms, a cause of action is a basis for
imposin liability, whereas a remedy is a consequence of imposing
liability. 5 Thus, injured seamen have causes of action against
shipowner-employers for Jones Act negligence, unseaworthiness,
maintenance and cure, and wrongfully withholding maintenance and
cure.
12. Id,
13. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 804 (3d ed. 2000).
14. Id.
15. The Supreme Court's Townsend opinion makes good use of the cause of
action-remedy distinction, noting that "both the general maritime cause of action
(maintenance and cure) and the remedy (punitive damages) were well established
before the passage of the Jones Act" and emphasizing that the "Jones Act ...
created a statutory cause of action for negligence, but it did not eliminate
preexisting remedies available to seamen for the separate common-law cause of
action based on a seaman's right to maintenance and cure." Atl. Sounding Co. v.
Townsend, 129 S. Ct. 2561, 2570, 2572 (2009).
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When any of these causes of action succeed, the available
remedies can include compensatory damages for medical and
related expenses, lost earnings and earning capacity, and pain and
suffering. When a seaman's injuries are fatal, the family has a
wrongful death remedy 16 that might include compensatory damages
for loss of support, loss of services, and loss of society. The estate of
a fatally injured seaman has a survival remedy that enables the estate
to sue for whatever damages the deceased would have been able to
sue for at the moment of death.
And-if the defendant's conduct was bad enough to warrant
punishment-the remedies in all of the foregoing types of cases
might also include punitive damages. In cases of seriously
blameworthy failure of an employer to furnish maintenance or cure,
the remedies might also include attorneys' fees.1
7
III. A SHORT VERSION OF THE MARITIME PuNITvE DAMAGES STORY
In U.S. maritime law up to 1990, the punitive damages remedy
was deployed in pursuit of the goals of punishing reprehensible
behavior and discouraging its repetition. The punitive damages
remedy obtained throughout maritime law, including property
damage cases, personal injury cases, and cases involving
shipowners' mistreatment of passengers and seamen.'
Then came Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., a bombshell Supreme
Court decision holding that the families of seamen killed by the
negligence of their employers or the unseaworthiness of the vessels
they serve cannot recover damages for loss of society.19 Miles had
nothing to do with punitive damages, but the courts of appeals soon
began finding in "[t]he logic and analytical framework of Miles"20 a
16. This is a remedy, not a cause of action. The family will assert whatever
cause of action the deceased would have asserted had the injuries not been fatal.
17. See, e.g., Hines v. J.A. LaPorte, Inc., 820 F.2d 1187 (lth Cir. 1987)
(affirming awards of $5,000 in punitive damages and $10,150 in attorneys' fees).
18. See generally Robertson, supra note 1. In the 1970s, some courts began
holding that punitive damages could not be sought in Jones Act cases. See infra
Part VI.F. This was a minority viewpoint until the lower courts began reading the
Supreme Court's 1990 decision in Miles to preclude seamen from seeking punitive
damages in any action against their employers. See infra note 19.
19. 498 U.S. 19, 32-33 (1990). For extravagant criticism of Miles, see, e.g.,
Hon. John R. Brown, Admiralty Judges: Flotsam on the Sea of Maritime Law?, 24
J. MAR. L. & COM. 249 (1993); Robert Force, The Curse of Miles v. Apex Marine
Corp.: The Mischief of Seeking "Uniformity" and "Legislative Intent" in
Maritime Personal Injury Cases, 55 LA. L. REv. 745 (1995).
20. Guevara v. Mar. Overseas Corp., 59 F.3d 1496, 1510 (5th Cir. 1995) (en
banc), abrogated by Townsend, 129 S. Ct. 2561.
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basis for denying punitive damages to seamen.2 1 On the view that
seamen have always been the most favored litigants in U.S.
maritime law, the idea then developed that if an injured seaman
cannot seek punitive damages, no personal injury plaintiff should be
able to do so.2 2 The next "logical" step would presumably have been
a complete obliteration of the punitive damages remedy because if
such damages are unavailable in personal injury cases, there seems
no principled reason that should they be available in property
damage cases.
The linchpin of the modem movement against maritime punitive
damages has been the courts of appeals decisions using Miles as a
basis for denying punitive damages to seamen. The driving force
behind these cases was not anything the Miles Court held or even
said but was simply a pronounced judicial disapproval of the
punitive damages remedy. But the "logic and analytical framework"
of Miles that the courts seized upon as their doctrinal tool has been
so often relied upon that the entailed chain of reasoning should be
set forth.
The Miles Court reached its conclusion that fatally injured
seamen's families cannot recover for loss of society in Jones Act
and unseaworthiness actions in the following way:
" In 1920 Congress enacted the Jones Act to provide seamen
with a negligence cause of action against their employers.
23
Rather than spelling out the negligence cause of action, the
Jones Act incorporates by reference the 1908 Federal
Employers' Liability Act (FELA), which sketches a
negligence cause of action for railway workers against their
24
employers.24
" FELA also sets forth a wrongful death remedy.25 The
relevant provision, 46 U.S.C. § 51, does not limit or specify
the types of compensatory damages that are available in
FELA wrongful death actions,26 but in 1913 the Supreme
Court held in Michigan Central Railroad Co. v. Vreeland
that plaintiffs in FELA wrongful death actions could recover
only for "pecuniary" loss-including loss of support and loss
21. In addition to Guevara, see Glynn v. Roy A] Boat Mgmt. Corp., 57 F.3d
1495 (9th Cir. 1995); Horsley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 15 F.3d 200 (1st Cir. 1994);
Miller v. Am. President Lines, Ltd., 989 F.2d 1450 (6th Cir. 1993).
22. See, e.g., Guevara, 59 F.3d at 1510; Wahlstrom v. Kawasaki Heavy
Indus., Ltd., 4 F.3d 1084, 1094 (2d Cir. 1993).
23. 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006).
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of services-and that loss of society (companionship) was
not a pecuniary loss.
27
" Miles held that when Congress incorporated FELA into the
Jones Act, it also incorporated Vreeland as judicial "gloss"
on FELA.28  Therefore, loss-of-society damages are
unavailable in Jones Act wrongful death actions just as they
are in FELA wrongful death actions.
* Miles further held that the unavailability of loss-of-society
damages in Jones Act cases entailed their unavailability in
general (nonstatutory) unseaworthiness actions because "[i]t
would be inconsistent with our place in the constitutional
scheme were we to sanction more expansive remedies in a
judicially created cause of action [for unseaworthiness] in
which liability is without fault than Congress has allowed in
cases of death resulting from negligence." 
2 9
In an impressive three-step tour de force, several courts of
appeals expanded the holding in Miles-that deceased seamen's
families cannot recover compensatory damages for loss of society in
actions for Jones Act negligence or unseaworthiness-into a broad
rule that punitive damages are wholly unavailable in all litigation
involving illness, injury, or death of seamen. 30 In the first step, the
courts seized upon the Vreeland and Miles characterization of loss -
of -society damages as "non-pecuniary" as a basis for asserting that
no FELA or Jones Act plaintiff can recover any form of non-
pecuniary damages.3 ' Second, they read Miles to mean that
categories of damages unavailable to Jones Act plaintiffs are also
unavailable to plaintiffs in the related general maritime actions for
unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure. 32 Third, they simply
pronounced in ipse dixit fashion that "punitive damages... are...
rightfully classified as non-pecuniary."
When I published the premature obituary of maritime punitive
damages in 1997, the use of Miles as a tool for denying punitive
damages in seamen's litigation was in its ascendancy. Then came
Baker, in which the Supreme Court upheld a punitive award under
general maritime law of $507.5 million to "commercial fishermen,
Native Alaskans, and landowners" who were damaged by the Exxon
27. 227 U.S. 59, 69-71 (1913).
28. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp, 498 U.S. 19, 32 (1990).
29. Id. at 32-33.
30. Guevara v. Mar. Overseas Corp., 59 F.3d 1496 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc)
abrogated by At. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 129 S. Ct. 2561 (2009).
31. Id. at 1512-13; Glynn v. Roy Al Boat Mgmt. Corp., 57 F.3d 1495, 1502
(9th Cir. 1995), abrogated by Townsend, 129 S. Ct. 2561.
32. Glynn, 57 F.3d at 1502.
33. Guevara, 59 F.3d at 1506.
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Valdez oil spill.34 Because there is no clear statutory or policy basis
for treating seamen less favorably than the types of plaintiffs who
succeeded in Baker, that decision seems to cast significant doubt on
the correctness of the view that seamen are foreclosed from seeking
punitive damages.
The most recent case in this line is Townsend, a five-four
decision holding that seamen can sue their employers for punitive
damages for seriously blameworthy violations of the maintenance
and cure obligation. Understanding the importance and potential
impact of Townsend (see infra Parts VII and VIII) will be aided by
first considering the following Parts that explore Miles in detail (Part
IV), analyze Baker (Part V), and set forth the arguments that the
Supreme Court confronted in Townsend (Part VI).
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF MILES
As discussed in Part III, a widely held belief that seamen have
no right to seek punitive damages was based primarily on Miles.36
But Miles afforded no legitimate support for the view.
A. The Holdings and Reasoning of Miles
1. Facts and Holding: Punitive Damages Were Not at Stake
Mercedel Miles was the mother of a seaman named Ludwick
Torregano who died from sixty-two stab wounds inflicted by a
fellow crew member on the vessel MV Archon.37 Miles pleaded
two causes of action against the Archon's owner and operators,
asserting their liability for unseaworthiness under the general
maritime law and for negligence under the Jones Act.38 She asserted
two types of fatal-injury remedies39 under which she sought five
categories of compensatory damages: (1) a wrongful death remedy
that in Miles' view should allow her to recover damages for loss of
support, loss of services, and loss of society; and (2) a survival
remedy that Miles argued should allow Torregano's estate to
recover damages for his pain and suffering and for his lost future
earnings.4 °
34. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2613 (2008).
35. Townsend, 129 S. Ct. 2561.
36. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990).
37. Id. at 21.
38. Id. See 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006).
39. See supra Part II.D.
40. Miles v. Melrose, 882 F.2d 976 (5th Cir. 1989).
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Miles also sought punitive damages. The trial court struck the
punitive damages claim. Miles did not sue the vicious stabber,4' but
only his employers (the ship's operators), and the trial court held
that the facts did not support holding the employers vicariously
liable for punitive damages.42 The Fifth Circuit affirmed this
ruling, 43 and the punitive damages issue dropped out of the case at
that point. The Supreme Court was not concerned with the issue,
and it mentioned punitive damages only in the course of reciting the
case's procedural history.44
Respecting Miles' five compensatory damages claims, the trial
court decided against the wrongful death claim for loss of society
and against the survival claim for lost future earnings. It upheld the
other three claims. The Fifth Circuit affirmed an award of $7,800 for
Miles' loss of support and services and $140,000 for Torregano's
pain and suffering.45 The Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs
petition for certiorari to decide "whether the parent of a seaman who
died from injuries aboard respondents' vessel may recover under
general maritime law for loss of society, and whether a claim for the
seaman's lost future earnings survives his death.",4
6
The Miles Court answered both questions no, affirming the Fifth
Circuit's decision that Miles' wrongful death remedy did not include
damages for loss of society47 and that her survival remedy did not
include damages for Torregano's lost future earnings.
48
2. The Plaintifs Two Causes of Action
The Supreme Court was not concerned with the Miles
defendants' liability vel non, but a quick look at this matter may
enhance understanding of the decision.
The defendants' liability under the unseaworthiness cause of
action was unproblematic. A shipowner is strictly liable for
unseaworthiness when an operationally defective ship hurts a
seaman, and the Fifth Circuit ruled that the vicious stabber's
"extraordinarily violent disposition demonstrated that he was unfit
41. She tried to, but he "was outside the jurisdiction of the district court and
could not be served." Id. at 981.
42. See id.
43. Id.
44. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19,22 (1990).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 21.
47. Id. at 32-33.
48. Id. at 36.
470 [Vol. 70
PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN MARITIME LAW
and therefore that the Archon was unseaworthy as a matter of
law. ,,
9
The defendants' liability under the cause of action for Jones Act
negligence was only slightly less obvious. The evidence showed that
the defendants should long since have known that the stabber was a
dangerous man.
50
3. The Plaintiff's Two Fatal-Injury Remedies
All of the issues addressed in Miles involved the categories of
compensatory damages available in maritime wrongful death and
survival actions. Potentially, the sources of these remedies were the
Jones Act51 and the holding in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.,
that general maritime law includes a wrongful death remedy and
(arguably) a survival remedy.52
The Jones Act was enacted in 1920 to fill a gap in federal
maritime law's fabric of protections for seamen. 53 The gap stemmed
from the Supreme Court's 1903 decision in The Osceola.4 In that
case the question was whether a seaman injured at work on a vessel
had a cause of action for the negligence of the vessel's master in
bringing about the injury.55 The Court held no, noting that injured
seamen were entitled to maintenance and cure and could sue in tort
for unseaworthiness but holding that they had no action against their
employers for workplace negligence.
56
The Jones Act filled the Osceola gap by incorporating by
reference the provisions of FELA.57 FELA sketches out a
negligence cause of action for railway workers and it includes a
wrongful death remedy58 and a survival remedy.
5§
The portion of Miles concluding that Miles' wrongful death
remedy would not redress loss of society proceeded in three steps.60
The Court first looked to a pre-Jones Act decision, Vreeland, which
gave a narrow construction to the FELA wrongful death provision.
6 1
49. Id. at 22.
50. See Miles v. Melrose, 882 F.2d 976, 984 (5th Cir. 1989).
51. 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006).
52. 398 U.S. 376 (1970). The Miles Court "decline[d] to address the issue" of
whether Moragne created a survival remedy. Miles, 498 U.S. at 34.
53. See Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 354 (1970).
54. 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
55. Id. at 175.
56. Id.
57. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (2006).
58. Id. § 51.
59. Id. § 59.
60. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32-33 (1990).
61. Mich. Cent. R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59 (1913).
2010]
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The provision says nothing about the categories of damages
available, 62 but the Vreeland Court reasoned that earlier and
contemporaneous wrongful death statutes were generally confined
to "pecuniary loss," that loss-of-society damages were not pecuniary
because they "cannot be measured or recompensed by money," and
that in enacting FELA the 1908 Congress must have meant to follow
the prevailing view.63
In its second step, the Miles Court concluded that Vreeland
precludes recovery for loss of society in wrongful death actions
under the Jones Act, explaining:
When Congress passed the Jones Act, the Vreeland gloss on
FELA, and the hoary tradition behind it, were well
established. Incorporating FELA unaltered into the Jones
Act, Congress must have intended to incorporate the
pecuniary limitation on damages as well. We assume that
Congress is aware of existing law when it passes legislation.
There is no recovery for loss of society in a Jones Act
wrongful death action. 64
The Miles Court's third step determined that the Jones Act
preclusion of loss of society damages also controlled the plaintiffs
general maritime (Moragne-based) wrongful death action. The
Court explained:
The Jones Act also precludes recovery for loss of society in
this case. The Jones Act applies when a seaman has been
killed as a result of negligence, and it limits recovery to
pecuniary loss. The general maritime claim here alleged that
Torregano had been killed as a result of the unseaworthiness
of the vessel. It would be inconsistent with our place in the
constitutional scheme were we to sanction more expansive
remedies in a judicially created cause of action in which
liability is without fault than Congress has allowed in cases
of death resulting from negligence. We must conclude that
there is no recovery for loss of society in a general maritime
action for the wrongful death of a Jones Act seaman.
65
Turning to the issue of whether Miles' survival action allowed
recovery for Torregano's lost future income, the Court's reasoning
was similar. Taking it as settled that the Jones Act-FELA survival
62. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (2006).
63. Vreeland, 227 U.S. at 70-71.
64. Miles, 498 U.S. at 32 (citation omitted).
65. Id. at 32-33.
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remedy66 does not allow such damages, the Court stated that
"[b]ecause Torregano's estate cannot recover for his lost future
income under the Jones Act, it cannot do so under general maritime
law. 67
B. Refuting the Revisionist Version ofMiles
The Miles opinion does not touch upon any issues other than the
types of compensatory damages available in maritime fatal-injury
litigation. So how did the courts of appeals manage to turn a
decision addressing compensatory damages in seamen's fatal-injury
cases into one controlling punitive damages in all types of seamen's
litigation? As discussed supra in Part III, the technique was simply
to assert that punitive damages are non-pecuniary damages and that
Miles holds that in no cause of action on behalf of a seaman may
any form of non-pecuniary damages be recovered. Both of those
ideas seem wrong.
1. Punitive Damages Are Easily Characterized as Pecuniary
In ordinary English, "pecuniary" means "consisting of or
pertaining to money" or "requiring the payment of money.
' 68
Black's Law Dictionary defines "pecuniary damages" as "damages
that can be estimated and monetarily compensated" and
"nonpecuniary damages" as "damages that cannot be measured in
money."'69 By any of these definitions, punitive damages can
sensibly be called pecuniary. They are awarded as money, can be
estimated, and-as recently exhaustively analyzed by the Supreme
Court in Baker-are awarded as "measured retribution.,
70
The revisionist reading of Miles not only proposed a
controversial definition of the term "non-pecuniary," but it also
entailed the implausible suggestion that the Miles Court would have
characterized punitive damages that way. This seems highly
unlikely. In her opinion for the Court in Miles, Justice O'Connor
used the term "non-pecuniary" just twice, at each instance tying it
66. 45 U.S.C. § 59 (2006).
67. Id. at 36.
68. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 965
(1981).
69. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 418 (8th ed. 2004).
70. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2633 (2008) (emphasis
added).
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tightly to the issue of compensatory damages for loss of society. 7 1
And not much more than a year before writing Miles, Justice
O'Connor relpeatedly referred to punitive damages as "pecuniary
punishment."
The pecuniary-non-pecuniary distinction came into Miles from
the Court's 1913 FELA decision in Vreeland.73 The Vreeland Court
was no more concerned with punitive damages than the Miles Court,
but it is hard to believe that the Vreeland Court would have
characterized punitive damages as non-pecuniary. At the time
Vreeland was decided, it seems to have been generally thought that
punitive damages were properly conceptualized as pecuniary rather
than not. For example, in Louisville, E. & St. L.R. Co. v. Clarke, the
Supreme Court described an ancient German remedy (called a
"weregild") as a privately initiated proceeding designed to give the
victim of a crime "a pecuniary satisfaction" while effecting "the
punishment of public crimes." 4 This sounds much like a modem
action for punitive damages. Moreover, in the pre-Vreeland
jurisprudence the Court routinely referred to civil and criminal fines
and penalties of all kinds as "pecuniary punishment." 75
The pecuniary-non-pecuniary distinction is a useful tool for
classifying subtypes of compensatory damages; classifying loss of
society and pain and suffering as non-pecuniary damages is a signal
that their assessment entails special difficulties and may require
special restrictions. But the pecuniary-non-pecuniary distinction is
not useful in the completely different realm of punitive damages:
"[ilt would be an abdication of judicial responsibility to preclude
recovery of punitive damages merely because they are
'nonpecumary. 4,76
71. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 30 (1990) ("nonpecuniary
loss of society suffered as the result of the death"); id. at 31 ("non-pecuniary loss,
such as loss of society").
72. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257,
295-97 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also
Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 614 n.7 (1993) (Court's opinion joined by
Justice O'Connor characterizing a civil forfeiture as "pecuniary punishment").
73. See 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006).
74. 152 U.S. 230, 239 (1894).
75. See Oklahoma ex rel. W. v. Gulf, C. & S.F.R. Co., 220 U.S. 290, 299
(1911); Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 77 (1904) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
Carter v. McLaughry, 183 U.S. 365, 393 (1902); Keck v. United States, 172 U.S.
434, 448 (1899); Stone v. United States, 167 U.S. 178, 186 (1897); The Bayonne,
159 U.S. 687, 688 (1895); Huntington v. Atrill, 146 U.S. 657, 681 (1892);
Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 299 (1888); Coffey v. United States,
116 U.S. 436, 444 (1886); Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 342 (1866); Norris v.
Crocker, 54 U.S. 429, 437 (1851); United States v. Carr, 49 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1850).
76. Force, supra note 19, at 793. See also Portwood v. Cooper Valley Elec.
Assoc., 785 P.2d 541, 543 (Alaska 1990) ("Because punitive damages are not
474 [Vol. 70
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None of the authorities that have been cited for the proposition
that punitive damages are non-pecuniary make any effort to justify
the appellation; each merely proclaims it, seeming eager to succumb
to word magic. (All of the explicit judicial statements that punitive
damages are non-pecuniary can be traced to a terse ipse dixit in
Kopczynski v. The Jacqueline.77)
2. Miles Does Not Rule Out All Non-Pecuniary Damages for
Seamen
Even in the compensatory damages context, the pecuniary-non-
pecuniary distinction has limited utility. The Miles Court used the
distinction as a tool for deciding the loss of society issue and only
for that. Miles' claim for Torregano's future earnings was
indisputably a pecuniary-loss claim, yet the Court rejected it.78 On
the other hand, the Court gave three indications that it approved of
Jones Act plaintiffs recovering for pain and suffering, although this
is a paradigmatic non-pecuniary item: (1) the Court said that "[t]he
Jones Act, through its incorporation of FELA, provides that a
seaman's right of action for injuries due to negligence survives to
the seaman's personal representative"; 79 injured seamen invariably
seek pain and sufferi~og damages; (2) the Court cited St. Louis, LM
& S.R. Co. v. Craft8 for the proposition that the FELA survival
remedy8' allows recovery for "losses suffered during the decedent's
lifetime"; 82 in Craft, the Court affirmed a $5,000 survival award for
the deceased's pain and suffering; 83 and (3) the Miles Court noted
with no hint of disapproval that the Fifth Circuit had awarded
"$140,000 for Torregano's pain and suffering."84
compensatory they are not subject to the pecuniary loss limitation."); Robertson,
supra note 1, at 164 (deploring the "mind-numbing [effect of the] 'nonpecuniary'
tag").
77. 742 F.2d 555, 561 (9th Cir. 1984).
78. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 34 (1990).
79. Id. at 33.
80. 237 U.S. 648 (1915).
81. 45 U.S.C. § 59 (2006).
82. Miles, 498 U.S. at 35.
83. Craft, 237 U.S. at 661. According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,
$5,000 in 1915 was worth about $106,586 in 2008 dollars. See www.bls.gov/
data/inflation calculator.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2009).
84. Miles, 498 U.S. at 22.
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V. AN ANALYSIS OF BAKER
A. Baker Reaffirmed Maritime Law's Recognition of Punitive
Damages
1. Baker Awarded Maritime Punitive Damages
In its 2008 decision in Baker, the Supreme Court upheld a
punitive damages award to fishermen whose livelihoods were
damaged by the Exxon Valdez oil spill.85 The Court unanimously
agreed that a punitive award was appropriate.
86
The Court also unanimously agreed that the punitive award was
based solely on federal maritime common law.87 The Court
emphasized this, stating that "maritime law remains federal common
law' 88 and asserting its "jurisdiction [under the grant of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction in U.S. Const., Art. III, § 2, cl. 3] to decide
[the case] in the manner of a common law court, subject to the
authority of Congress to legislate otherwise if it disagrees with the
judicial result."89
2. Baker Rests on Deep History
90
Writing for the Supreme Court in The Amiable Nancy in 1818,
Justice Story affirmed that general maritime law authorized
"exemplary damages [for] the proper punishment [of] lawless
misconduct." 91 In 1851 in Day v. Woodworth, the Court stated:
It is a well-established principle of the common law, that in
actions of trespass and all actions on the case for torts, a jury
may inflict what are called exemplary, punitive, or vindictive
damages upon a defendant, having in view the enormity of
his offence rather than the measure of compensation to the
plaintiff.92
85. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008).
86. Baker was an eight-zero decision, Justice Alito not participating. Five
Justices held that the lower court's punitive award of $2.5 billion must be cut to
$507.5 million. Id. at 2634. Three argued that the $2.5 billion award should have
been left standing. Id. at 2638-41.
87. A frequently-used synonym for federal maritime common law is "general
maritime law." See, e.g., Miles, 498 U.S. at 21.
88. Baker, 128 S. Ct. at 2616.
89. Id. at 2619.
90. See generally Robertson, supra note 1.
91. 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546, 558 (1818).
92. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851).
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And in 1893 in Lake Shore & MS. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, the Court
cited The Amiable Nancy and Day for the following proposition:
In this [C]ourt the doctrine is well settled that in actions of
tort the jury, in addition to the sum awarded by way of
compensation for the plaintiff's injury, may award
exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages, sometimes
called "smart money," if the defendant has acted wantonly,
or oppressively, or with such malice as implies a spirit of
mischief or criminal indifference to civil obligations .... 93
The Lake Shore Court went on to say that "courts of admiralty...
proceed... upon the same principles as courts of common law, in
allowing exemplary damages."
94
B. Baker Implies that Seamen Are Entitled to Seek Punitive
Damages
The parties awarded punitive damages in Baker were
"commercial fishermen, Native Alaskans, and landowners;" 95 the
Court had no occasion to directly address seamen's rights. However,
it is hard to fathom how seamen, who by long tradition are
admiralty's most favored litigants, 96 could somehow be worse off
under federal maritime law than fishermen and landowners.
The Baker Court cited Union Oil Co. v. Oppen97 as the basis for
the fishermen's cause of action for loss-of-livelihood compensatory
damages.98 The reference lends emphasis to the view that it makes
no sense for seamen to lack a remedy available to commercial
fishermen because the Oppen court built its recognition of the
fishermen's right upon its understanding of seamen's rights. The
Oppen court reasoned that fishermen "have been treated as seamen"
and are thus allowed to invoke "the familiar principle that seamen
are the favorites of admiralty and their economic interests entitled to
the fullest possible legal protection."
99
93. 147U.S. 101, 107 (1893).
94. Id. at 108.
95. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2613 (2008).
96. See Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 354 (1995) (stating that
seamen have "heightened legal protections [that are] unavailable to other maritime
workers"); id. at 379 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasizing "admiralty law's
favored treatment of seamen"); Bainbridge v. Merchs.' & Miners' Transp. Co.,
287 U.S. 278, 282 (1932) (stating that seamen are "a favored class").
97. 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974).
98. See Baker, 128 S. Ct. at 2630 n.21.
99. Oppen, 501 F.2d at 567 (emphasis added) (citing Robins Dry Dock Repair
Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927)).
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VI. ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT IN
TOWNSEND
The Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Townsend followed the
court's pre-Miles jurisprudence and held that seamen have the right
to seek punitive damages from employers who wantonly violate
their maintenance and cure obligations. 100 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to address the conflict between the Eleventh
Circuit and the circuits that had read Miles to abolish seamen's
rights to seek punitive damages.1
0 1
In the Supreme Court, the arguments for the shipowner all
revolved around what this Article calls the revisionist view of Miles.
The arguments for the seamen took the view of Miles and Baker that
is set forth supra in Parts IV and V. Some additional arguments for
the seaman are set forth in the subparts below.
A. Seamen Have Always Had the Right to Seek Punitive Damages
A study of the early American jurisprudence on seamen's rights
soon brings the realization that "nineteenth-century seamen led
miserable lives."'1 2  Shipowners owed passengers decent
treatment,'0 3 but they could often harshly misuse seamen without
anyone batting an eye. Congress did not outlaw "cruel and unusual
punishment" of seamen until 1835,1'4 and flogging was legal until
1850.105 Throughout the century, a seaman who deserted the ship
could be arrested by public authorities and forcibly returned. 10
6
100. Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 496 F.3d 1282 (1 1th Cir. 2007), cert.
granted, 129 S. Ct. 490 (2008) (No. 08-214), af'd, 129 S. Ct. 2561 (2009) (No.
08-214).
101. See At. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 129 S. Ct. 2561, 2565-66 (2009)
("[T]he Eleventh Circuit . . . held that respondent could pursue his punitive
damages claim for the willful withholding of maintenance and cure. 496 F.3d at
1285-1286. The decision conflicted with those of other Courts of Appeals, see,
e.g., Guevara v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 59 F.3d 1496 (5th Cir. 1995 (en banc);
Glynn v. Roy Al Boat Management Corp., 57 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1995), and we
granted certiorari .... ").
102. DAVID W. ROBERTSON, STEVEN F. FRIEDELL & MICHAEL F. STURLEY,
ADMIRALTY AND MARrrIIE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 163 (2d ed. 2008).
103. See Robertson, supra note 1, at 88-90 (analyzing Chamberlain v.
Chandler, 5 F. Cas. 413, 414 (C.C.D. Mass. 1823) (No. 2575), in which punitive
damages were awarded against a ship's captain for "lasciviousness" and other
misconduct toward passengers).
104. Act of March 3, 1835,4 Stat. 776-77.
105. SeeAct of Sept 28, 1850, 9 Stat. 515.
106. See Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897) (holding that statutes
authorizing the arrest and forced return of deserters were not in conflict with the
Thirteenth Amendment).
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Nevertheless, admiralty courts repeatedly assured seamen that
they were "emphatically the wards of the Admiralty." 10 7 When
seamen's employers went too far, admiralty courts would award
punitive damages, just as in cases involving mistreated passengers
and other victims of abuse.10 8 When evaluating these early cases, it
is necessary to remember that "[t]he distinction between punitive
and compensatory damages is a modem refinement."'10 9 As the
Supreme Court recently noted in Baker, "American courts [began]
to speak of punitive damages as separate and distinct from
compensatory damages [only as] the [nineteenth] century
progressed."
' i
The earliest published indication that American admiralty courts
would protect seamen by mulcting their abusers with monetary
punishment seems to be the 1799 decision in Swift v. The Happy
Return1 11 where Judge Peters discussed an earlier (unnamed) case in
which he had found a shipowner guilty of a "very atrocious" failure
to provide seamen with proper food." Judge Peters said he handled
that situation by threatening the shipowner with a judicially-created
monetary penalty,' 1 3 thereby bringing about an "accommodation"
between the seamen and the shipowner.
114
The earliest reported decision in which a seaman was actually
awarded punishment money seems to have been Gould v.
Christianson.115 In that case, the ship's master's discipline of an
inexperienced and clumsy "gentleman's son"116 who had shipped as
an apprentice seamen was held excessive under the circumstances.
The court deemed it necessary to "augment the damages beyond a
mere remuneration for the bodily injury" in order to deter "coarse
and rude usage" of such an apprentice in furtherance of our
107. Ramsay v. Allegre, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 611, 620 (1827) (Johnson, J.,
concurring). The Supreme Court has called seamen "wards of admiralty" in at
least twenty-four decisions. See Westlaw's SCT data base and search "wards" /s
"admiralty."
108. Robertson, supra note 1, at 88-95, 99-108.
109. Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co. v. Yeldell, 274 U.S. 112, 116 (1927).
110. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2621 (2008).
111. 23 F. Cas. 560 (D. Pa. 1799) (No. 13,697).
112. See id. at 561 n.2.
113. The Act of July 20, 1790, 1 Stat. 135-requiring shipowners to provide
adequate food and water "during the voyage" and imposing a penalty for "short
allowance"--did not cover Judge Peters' "atrocious" case, which involved
seamen's "[e]xpenses for boarding on shore." Id. Judge Peters said the penalty he
threatened the shipowner with ",would have gone the length of payment equal to
that directed [in the statute] for short allowance." Id.
114. Id.




country's "deep interest in encouraging young men of capacity,
ambition, and good character, to seek employment in the merchant
marine. 117
A number of other courts also made punitive awards to seamen.
In The Rolph, the ship's mate severely beat a seaman, and the master
then callously refused to provide medical care." 8 The court
described the mate as a "brutal . . . giant, weighing in the
neighborhood of 285 pounds, all bone and muscle, and with a
reputation for ferocity as wide as the seven seas." ' 1 9 It noted that the
master "brutally refused" the requested medical care "with curses
and words of vituperation.' 120 It emphasized that "[s]ailors on an
American ship.., must not be subject to such treatment" because
"it is of the utmost importance to the manifest destiny of this
republic upon the ocean that the youth of America should be
attracted to the sea."'12 1 To enforce this national policy, the court
made a combined compensatory-punitive award of $10,000.122
In The Margharita, a seaman who fell overboard and lost his leg
to "a shark or some other marine monster" was denied proper
medical care for "nearly four months." 123 During the four-month
delay the seaman was in "unspeakable agony. . . , with the ragged
extremity of his cruelly wounded leg incased at times in a box of hot
tar and at other times rudely bandaged by the kind, but
inexperienced, hands of his shipmates., 124 The district court held the
vessel liable for $1,500 in compensatory and punitive damages,
stating:
It is indispensable that in cases of serious injuries to seamen
. .. I that in order to obtain proper surgical or medical
assistance for them, the courts of admiralty, which proceed
ever upon the broadest principles of humanity and justice,
should enforce the reasonable rules so frequently announced
by the courts .... Such is the duty of the courts, not only to
compensate the seaman for his unnecessary and unmerited
suffering when the duty of the ship is disregarded, but [also]
to emphasize the importance of humane and correct
117. Id. at 863--64.
118. 293 F. 269, 270 (N.D. Cal. 1923), affd, 299 F. 52 (9th Cir. 1924).
119. Id. at269.
120. Id. at 270-72.
121. Id. at271.
122. This damages award is equivalent of about $125,908 in 2008 dollars. See
supra note 83.
123. 140 F. 820, 821, 825 (5th Cir. 1905).
124. Id. at 828.
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judgment under the circumstances on the part of the [ship's]
master. 1
25
The Fifth Circuit reversed, not because of any doubt about the
propriety of the punitive damages remedy, but on the view that the
ship's master had done as well as he could under the
circumstances. 126
Other courts also gave clear indications that punitive damages
are appropriate for seriously blameworthy violations of the
maintenance and cure obligation. In The Scotland,127 Judge Addison
Brown (who had a large reputation as an admiralty expert T28) made a
generous damages award for the ship's improper medical treatment
of an injured seaman and said that he would have added "punitive
damages" if he had not been persuaded of the "inherent kindness" of
the ship's master.'2 9 In the similar case of The Vigilant, Judge
Brown made a compensatory damages award for the ship's neglect
of an injured seaman's medical needs and said that he would have
been "bound to add considerably" to that award if he had not been
"entirely satisfied of the master's good faith in his conduct as well
as of his intent to treat the seaman kindly and justly.' ' 13d In The
Svealand, the injured seaman's medical needs were neglected
aboard the ship, but the shipowner eventually paid all of the
seaman's medical expenses. 13 The court awarded an additional
$500 for the seaman's pain and suffering, noting "the apparently
aggravated character of the injury" and stating that it would have
made a higher award if the shiowner's medical outlays had not
already been so "considerable."'
I l s
Courts made punitive awards to seamen in a number of other
cases. 133 In an even larger number, courts gave indications in dictum
125. Id.
126. Id. at 272.
127. 42 F. 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1890).
128. See Robertson, supra note 1, at 109-10 & n.194.
129. The Scotland, 42 F. at 927.
130. 30 F. 288, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1887).
131. 136 F. 109 (4th Cir. 1905).
132. Id. at 113. See also Nevitt v. Clarke, 18 F. Cas. 29, 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1846)
(No. 10,138) (dictum that "vindictive damages" would lie for "wanton and
unjustifiable" violations of seamen's rights); The Childe Harold, 5 F. Cas. 619,
620 (S.D.N.Y. 1846) (No. 2676) (stating that "punitive and compensatory"
damages would be appropriate if the ship had fed rotted food to the crew).
133. See Unica v. United States, 287 F. 177, 180 (S.D. Ala. 1923)
(characterizing the ship's master's response to a seaman's need for medical
attention as "inexcusable . . . indifferen[ce]" and awarding $1,500 in
compensatory and punitive damages); The Troop, 118 F. 769, 770-72 (D. Wash.
1902), affd, 128 F. 856 (9th Cir. 1904) ("shocking" and "monstrous" refusal of
medical care yielded combined compensatory-punitive award of $4,000); The
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that punitive damages would be to protect seamen from seriously
blameworthy abuses of their rights.134 The weight of the
City of Carlisle, 39 F. 807, 811-17 (D. Ore. 1889) (calling the ship's master's
treatment of a seriously injured sixteen-year-old seaman "brutal and indecent,"
"simply inhuman," and "a grievous wrong" and awarding $1,530 in compensatory
and punitive damages); Tomlinson v. Hewett, 24 F. Cas. 29, 32 (D. Cal. 1872)
(No. 14,087) (captain's tricking a seaman with smallpox into going ashore so as to
sail off and leave the sick man behind merited avowedly "large" $2,500 award);
Brown v. Howard, 14 Johns. 119 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1817) ("harsh and rigorous, and
altogether unjustifiable" punishment of seaman "merit[ed] severe animadversion"
and led to a combined compensatory-punitive award). See also Pac. Packing &
Nay. Co. v. Fielding, 136 F. 577, 579-80 (9th Cir. 1905) ($5,000 award against a
shipowner that included "smart money... as a penalty upon the wrongdoer" for
ship captain's "wanton or oppressive conduct" in imprisoning a seaman was
reversed because the captain was not sued and the defendant shipowner was not
vicariously liable for punitive damages); Latchimacker v. Jacksonville Towing &
Wrecking Co., 181 F. 276, 278-79 (S.D. Fla. 1910), affd, 184 F. 987 (5th Cir.
1910) (remitting $10,000 jury award against a towing company that injured a
seaman aboard another vessel to $4,826 on the view that the jury's award included
"exemplary damages" and that no "wantonness or reckless negligence on the part
of the defendant" had been shown); Sheridan v. Furbur, 21 F. Cas. 1266, 1269
(S.D.N.Y. 1834) (No. 12,761) (holding that a seaman who had been subjected to
"unnecessarily abrupt and severe" discipline was entitled to demand "a
punishment in damages corresponding to the wantonness of the wrong" but that
the seaman had forfeited his entitlement by admitting that he brought suit only at
the instigation of an enemy of the defendant).
134. The following cases are presented in chronological order: Sampson v.
Smith, 15 Mass. 365, 370 (Mass. 1819) (stating that "malicious or vindictive"
punishment of a seaman would yield "retributive justice [to] apportion the penalty
and the damages to the malignity of the [punisher's] motives"); Elwell v. Martin, 8
F. Cas. 584, 587-88 (D. Me. 1824) (No. 4425) (indicating that "a criminal abuse
of power" in punishing a seaman would warrant "vindictive" damages); Hutson v.
Jordan, 12 F. Cas. 1089, 1092 (D. Me. 1837) (No. 6959) (suggesting that ship's
officers who assault seamen are exposed to "exemplary damages"); Sherwood v.
Hall, 21 F. Cas. 1292, 1293 (D. Mass. 1837) (No. 12,777) (dictum that the master
of a ship who took on a minor as a seaman, knowing this was against the seaman's
father's wishes, could be held to "severe" and perhaps "exemplary damages");
Thompson v. Oakland, 23 F. Cas. 1064, 1065 (D. Mass. 1841) (No. 13,971)
(dictum that "exemplary damages" will lie for "wanton violation of [a seaman's]
contract [of employment]"); Jay v. Almy, 13 F. Cas. 387, 389-90 (C.C.D. Mass.
1846) (No. 7236) (master who wrongly suspected a seaman of fomenting mutiny
and imprisoned him was not liable for "smart money or vindictive damages" only
because his actions, while exhibiting poor judgment, were not malicious); The
Australia, 2 F. Cas. 236, 238 (D. Me. 1859) (No. 667) (dictum that "aggravated
damage[s]" will lie if a ship leaves a seaman in a foreign port without good cause);
The General Rucker, 35 F. 152, 155, 158-59 (W.D. Tenn. 1888) (stating that a
vessel whose mate "tapped [a seaman] on the head with [a] monkey-wrench,"
knocking him into the river, was "no doubt" exposed to punitive damages but
finding that the mate's conduct was not quite bad enough); The State of Missouri,
76 F. 376, 380 (7th Cir. 1896) (stating that a steamboat captain who left port with
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jurisprudence is overwhelming: nineteenth-century seamen
indisputably had the right to seek punitive damages.
B. The Right of Seamen to Seek Punitive Damages Seemed
Especially Clear in the Maintenance and Cure Context
1. Maintenance and Cure Law Aims at Protecting Seamen While
Avoiding Litigation
The responsibility to provide sick and hurt seamen with
maintenance (room and board) and cure (medical care) is an
"ancient duty" that "has been imposed upon the shipowners by all
maritime nations."' 35 Maintenance and cure are the oldest and most
fundamental of the seamen's rights. 136 The Supreme Court has often
emphasized that "the nature and foundations of the liability require
that it be not narrowly confined or whittled down by restrictive and
artificial distinctions defeating its broad and beneficent purposes."'
137
The law of maintenance and cure is designed to ensure that
injured and sick seamen get quick and unstinting maintenance and
cure for humanitarian reasons, and to secure their rehabilitation and
return to service.1 38 Litigiousness is anathema. In Farrell v. United
States, the Supreme Court emphasized this, stating:
It has been the merit of the seaman's right to maintenance
and cure that it is so inclusive as to be relatively simple, and
can be understood and administered without technical
considerations. It has few exceptions or conditions to stir
contentions, cause delays, and invite litigations .... [T]he
spirit and function of the doctrine [seek to avoid] the
waterfront laborers aboard and tried to force them to serve as crew members
would have been "mulcted in exemplary damages" if sued but holding that the
defendant shipowner was not vicariously liable for punitive damages); The
Ludlow, 280 F. 162, 163-64 (N.D. Fla. 1922) (indicating that a ship's captain who
unjustifiably imprisoned a seaman would be liable for "exemplary or punitive"
damages but holding that the captain's employer was not vicariously liable for
punitive damages).
135. De Zon v. Am. President Lines, Ltd., 318 U.S. 660, 665, 667 (1943).
136. See Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 730 (1943); O'Donnell v.
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36, 41-42 (1943); Calmar S.S. Corp.
v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 527 (1938).
137. Aguilar, 318 U.S. at 735. See also Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523,
530 (1951).
138. In an often-quoted passage, Justice Story elaborated these points in
Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480, 482-83 (D. Me. 1823) (No. 6,047).
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litigiousness which has made the landman's remedy so often
a promise to the ear to be broken to the hope. 139
What this means is that "[m]aintenance and cure are intended to
be a remedy free of uncertainty and administrative red tape. The
employer has a duty to promptly investigate any claim and should
resolve doubts in favor of paying the seaman his due."'
140
Nevertheless, litigation is sometimes necessary. 14 1 When the
employer unjustifiably fails to provide maintenance and cure, the
seaman can sue to enforce the obligzation and recover the value of
the unpaid maintenance and cure. rM2 If the employer's failure to
provide maintenance and cure was negligent, the seamen can also
recover compensatory damages resulting from the nonpayment,
143
"such as the aggravation of the seaman's condition, determined by
the usual principles applied in tort cases to measure compensatory
damages."' 144 And if the "shipowner, in failing to pay maintenance
and cure, has not only been unreasonable but has been more
egregiously at fault," 145 there was a "line of . . . authority for
awarding punitive damages." 46
2. Well Before the Jones Act Was Enacted (in 1920), the
Availability of the Punitive Damages Remedy in Maintenance
and Cure Cases Was Settled Law
A number of the cases treated supra in Part VI.A were actions
against shipowners for dishonoring the maintenance and cure
obligation. There is little doubt that the pre-Jones Act law of
maintenance and cure included the punitive damages remedy.
139. 336 U.S. 511,516 (1949).
140. THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW 307 (4th ed.
2004).
141. American Maritime Cases (AMC) has reported about 1,115 maintenance
and cure cases since its inception in 1923. See AMC five-year digests for 1923-27
through 2003-07, at Articles & Wages ## 143, 144, 161; Illness # 112; and
Personal Injury## 118, 138, 141.
142. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 169-73 (1903).
143. The Iriquois, 194 U.S. 240 (1904).
144. Morales v. Garijak, Inc., 829 F.2d 1355, 1358 (5th Cir. 1987), abrogated
on other grounds by Guevara v. Mar. Overseas Corp., 59 F.3d 1496 (5th Cir.
1995) (en bane).
145. Id.
146. Robertson, supra note 1, at 149.
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3. The Jones Act Did Not Take Away Any Pre-Existing Seamen 's
Remedies
In more than a dozen cases, the Supreme Court has affirmed that
the Jones Act did not take anything away from seamen.
147
4. Vaughan v. Atkinson Supports the Availability of Punitive
Damages in Maintenance and Cure Actions
When Clifford Vaughan fell ill with tuberculosis, his employer's
refusal to provide maintenance was "callous,... recalcitran[t], ...
willful and persistent.' ' 148 As a result, Vaughan, sick as he was, had
to go to work as a taxi driver. 14 9 When Vaughan brought suit, the
district court held that he was entitled only to the unpaid
maintenance-no damages and no attorneys' fees-and, further, that
the employer was entitled to a credit for Vaughan's taxicab
earnings. 15 The Fourth Circuit affirmed.' 5 1
The Supreme Court, in Vaughan v. Atkinson, reversed the Fourth
Circuit, holding that the credit was inappropriate and that attorneys'
fees should have been awarded. 152 Justices Stewart and Harlan
dissented on the credit issue.1 53 On the attorneys' fees issue, Justices
Stewart and Harlan indicated that the Court had probably reached
147. See, e.g., Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 248 (1942)
("[The Jones Act] is to be liberally construed to carry out its full purpose, which
was to enlarge admiralty's protection to its wards."); The Arizona v. Anelich, 298
U.S. 110, 123 (1936) ("[T]he Jones Act ... was remedial [legislation], for the
benefit and protection of seamen who are peculiarly the wards of admiralty. Its
purpose was to enlarge that protection, not to narrow it."); Bainbridge v. Merchs.'
& Miners' Transp. Co., 287 U.S. 278, 282 (1932) ("Seamen have always been
regarded as wards of the admiralty, and their rights, wrongs, and injuries a special
subject of the admiralty jurisdiction. The policy of Congress, as evidenced by its
legislation, has been to deal with them as a favored class." (citations omitted));
Pac. S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130, 138-39 (1928) ("[The Jones Act] was not
intended to restrict in any way the long-established right of a seaman to
maintenance, cure, and wages." (emphasis added)). See also Norfolk Shipbuilding
& Drydock Corp. v. Garris, 532 U.S. 811, 818 (2001); Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis,
515 U.S. 347, 354 (1995); McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 342
(1991); Am. Exp. Lines, Inc. v. Alvez, 446 U.S. 274, 283-84 (1980); Cox v. Roth,
348 U.S. 207, 209 (1955); Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 782 (1952);
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 431 (1939); Beadle v. Spencer,
298 U.S. 124, 129-30 (1936); Cortes v. Bait. Insular Line, Inc., 287 U.S. 367,
377-78 (1932); Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635, 640-41 (1930).
148. Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530-31 (1962).
149. Vaughan v. Atkinson, 291 F.2d 813, 814 (4th Cir. 1961).
150. Vaughan v. Atkinson, 200 F. Supp. 802 (E.D. Va. 1960).
151. Vaughan, 291 F.2d 813.
152. Vaughan, 369 U.S. 527.
153. Id. at 534-40 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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the correct result but that the attorneys' fees award needed a firmer
doctrinal justification than the majority had provided: 154
[The majority cites] nothing to [justify] a departure from the
well-established rule [the "American Rule"] that counsel
fees may not be recovered as compensatory damages.
However, if the shipowner's refusal to pay maintenance
stemmed from a wanton and intentional disregard of the
legal rights of the seaman, the latter would be entitled to
exemplary damages in accord with traditional concepts of
the law of damages. While the amount so awarded would be
in the discretion of the fact finder, and would not necessarily
be measured by the amount of counsel fees, indirect
compensation for such expenditures might thus be made.'
55
The Vaughan majority did not respond to Justices Stewart and
Harlan's views on the fee-award point. However, the majority
opinion bristles with indignation on behalf of the mistreated
seaman, 156 and it seems likely that the only reason the majority did
not award punitive damages was that Vaughan had not asked for
them. The highly regarded Gilmore and Black treatise took that
view, stating:
154. The majority's explanation of the doctrinal basis for the fee award is
analyzed in David W. Robertson, Court-Awarded Attorneys' Fees in Maritime
Cases: The "American Rule" in Admiralty, 27 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 507, 552-53
(1996).
155. Vaughan, 369 U.S. at 540 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted) (citing Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371
(1851)). The relevant passage in Day stated:
It is a well-established principle of the common law, that in actions of
trespass and all actions on the case for torts, a jury may inflict what are
called exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages upon a defendant,
having in view the enormity of his offence rather than the measure of
compensation to the plaintiff... [T]he degree of punishment to be thus
inflicted must depend on the peculiar circumstances of each case. It must
be evident, also, that as it depends upon the degree of malice,
wantonness, oppression, or outrage of the defendant's conduct, the
punishment of his delinquency cannot be measured by the expenses of
the plaintiff in prosecuting his suit. It is true that damages, assessed by
way of example, may thus indirectly compensate the plaintiff for money
expended in counsel-fees; but the amount of these fees cannot be taken as
the measure of punishment or a necessary element in its infliction.
156. The Court called the employer's refusal to provide maintenance "callous,"
"recalcitran[t]," "willful[,] and persistent" and said "[i]t is difficult to imagine a
clearer case of damages suffered for failure to pay maintenance than this one." Id
at 531. It disparaged the idea that the employer should be credited with Vaughan's
taxicab earnings, stating that to allow this would create "a sorry day for seamen"
and put "a dreadful weapon in the hands of unconscionable employers." Id. at 533.
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It will be noted that the [Vaughan] Justices were, in effect,
unanimous on the damage recovery. The dissenting Justices
felt that the exemplary or punitive damages, if plaintiff was
found entitled to them, should be awarded as such; the
majority Justices, perhaps because of their narrow
interpretation of the grant of certiorari and in order to avoid
further proceedings, awarded what were essentially punitive
damages under the name of counsel fees.
157
In Robinson v. Pocahontas, Inc., the First Circuit agreed, noting
that Justices Stewart and Harlan were dissenting on another point
and were "seemingly in agreement with the majority's fundamental
premise" that punitive damages were appropriate. 58 In the three
decades following Vaughan, many other courts also relied on
Vaughan as authority for awarding punitive damages against callous
and recalcitrant employers. 1
59
5. The Two Fundamental Policies of Maintenance and Cure
Law Require an Effective Penalty
In Miles the Supreme Court cited the work of Judge Richard
Posner as presenting "strong policy arguments" for allowing recovery
of damages for a fatal accident victim's lost future income in survival
actions brought by the decedent's estate.' 60 Judge Posner has also
157. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 9, at 313 (citations omitted).
158. 477 F.2d 1048, 1051 (1st Cir. 1973).
159. See, e.g., Hines v. LaPorte, Inc., 820 F.2d 1187, 1189 (11th Cir. 1987);
Harper v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 741 F.2d 87, 88 (5th Cir. 1984); Holmes v. J. Ray
McDermott & Co., 734 F.2d 1110, 1118 (5th Cir. 1984); In re Merry Shipping,
Inc., 650 F.2d 622, 625 (5th Cir. 1981); Trident Marine, Inc. v. M/V Atticos, Civ.
A. Nos. 93-1018, 93-1070, 93-3116, 1995 WL 91125, at *1 (E.D. La. Mar. 1,
1995); Ridenour v. Holland Am. Line Westours, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 910, 912-13
(W.D. Wash. 1992); Cheramie v. Garland, Civ. A. Nos. 86-5540, 1989 WL
133098, at *5 (E.D. La. Oct. 19, 1989); In re Den Norske Amerikalinje A/S, 276
F. Supp. 163, 173-74 (N.D. Ohio 1967), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. U.S.
Steel Corp. v. Fuhrman, 407 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir. 1969); Weason v. Harville, 706
P.2d 306, 309-10 (Alaska 1985). The foregoing cases from the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits were overruled or undermined by Guevara v. Maritime Overseas Corp.,
59 F.3d 1496 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc), abrogated by Atl. Sounding Co. v.
Townsend, 129 S. Ct. 2561 (2009) or Glynn v. Roy Al Boat Management Corp., 57
F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1995), abrogated by Townsend, 129 S. Ct. 2561 (2009), and
the Alaska decision was overruled by Stone v. Int'l Marine Carriers, Inc., 918
P.2d 551 (Alaska 1996). However, Townsend has presumably restored the validity
of the pre-Guevara cases. See infra Part VII. Indeed, Townsend cites Hines and
Robinson approvingly. See Townsend, 129 S. Ct. at 2571 n.5.
160. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 35-37 (1990).
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presented strong policy arguments for punitive damages in virtually
all cases of serious wrongdoing. 161
The need for a punitive damages penalty to deter serious
wrongdoing is especially apparent in the maintenance and cure
context in order to further the law's central policies of protecting
seamen and avoiding litigation. 162 As the Alaska Supreme Court
explained:
When a shipowner refuses to pay maintenance and cure the
seaman's only alternative is a lawsuit, which is a lengthy and
expensive process. During this time, the seaman may have
no funds to effect his recovery, and thus may be forced to
work when he should be resting. In addition, the shipowner
might use a refusal to pay maintenance as a bargaining tool,
forcing an impoverished seaman to accept a low amount or
face a lengthy court battle. Thus, the availability of punitive
damages will act as a deterrent to the unscrupulous
employer, and will result in more speedy resolution of
maintenance and cure claims. 1
63
The absence of a punitive damages penalty would have two
undesirable consequences: not only would it encourage
unscrupulous employers to take advantage of unrepresented or
poorly represented seamen, but it would also mean that a seaman
with a pure maintenance and cure claim (i.e., a maintenance and
cure claim unaccompanied by a related Jones Act or
unseaworthiness claim) would have difficulty finding a competent
lawyer. Indeed, the Supreme Court has frequently recognized that
punitive damages may be necessary "when the value of injury and
the corresponding compensatory award are small (providing low
incentives to sue).'164
Attorneys' fees awards do not answer either of the foregoing
problems. Fee awards do not constitute a sufficient deterrent
because they are blind to the conduct of the defendant and hence
cannot be scaled to punish and deter reprehensibility. Fee awards
will not attract high-quality lawyers to help seamen in pure
161. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 47-48, 160-63, 184-85,302-07 (1987).
162. See supra Part VI.B. 1.
163. Weason, 706 P.2d at 310 (citations omitted).
164. Exxon Shipping Co v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2622 (2008). See also
Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 35 (1889) (same); cf Pac.
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1991) (approvingly discussing
Humes and Beckwith); Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 523 (1885)
(reasoning that punitive damages in small-injury cases are desirable because
otherwise "no effort would be made by the sufferer to obtain redress").
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maintenance and cure cases because fee awards are based on the
reasonable amount of time spent by the plaintiff's attorney
multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate of the attomey-taking into
account "the amount involved and the results obtained"165-and are
therefore likely to be too small to suffice.
Moreover, there is an additional problem with relying on
attorneys' fees as the only penalty for flouting the maintenance and
cure obligation. Some of the proponents of restricting employers'
exposure solely to the counsel-fees penalty have maintained that the
penalty's doctrinal justification is the courts' inherent authority to
punish abuses of litigation. 66 This means that the attorneys' fees
penalty "may not be used to sanction pre-litigation conduct."' 67 The
limitation cripples the sanction:
If attorneys' fees are awardable only for abuse of the
litigation process, then the unscrupulous employer need have
no fear of behaving with full recalcitrance right up to the
point when the seaman has to go to court. Conversely, an
attorney advising a seaman will need to file a lawsuit as
quickly as possible in order to get the potential penalty clock
started. These are perverse incentives.r8
These "perverse incentives" fly in the teeth of both of the
fundamental policies of maintenance and cure law set forth in supra
Part VI.B. 1.
In Townsend the shipowner-employer sought to assure the
Supreme Court that employers generally want to "do the right thing"
and that there is no "empirical evidence" that an attorneys' fees
penalty is insufficient. But these were somewhat implausible claims.
In the first place, we all know that Justice Holmes' "bad man's
counterparts turn up from time to time."169 Moreover, as the
Supreme Court explained in Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc.,
modem seamen continue to require protection "from the harsh
consequences of arbitrary and unscrupulous actions of their
employers, to which, as a class, they are peculiarly exposed."'170 In
165. Glynn v. Roy Al Boat Mgmt. Corp., 57 F.3d 1495, 1501 n.8 (9th Cir.
1995) (citation omitted), abrogated by At. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 129 S. Ct.
2561 (2009).
166. Guevara v. Mar. Overseas Corp., 59 F.3d 1496, 1498, 1503 (5th Cir.
1995) (en banc), abrogated by Townsend, 129 S. Ct. 2561.
167. Id.
168. David W. Robertson, The Future of Maritime Law in the Federal Courts:
Personal Injury and Wrongful Death, 31 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 293, 306 (2000).
169. Baker, 128 S. Ct. at 2627.
170. 458 U.S. 564, 572 (1982) (quoting Collie v. Ferguson, 281 U.S. 52, 55(1930)).
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Kraljic v. Berman Enterprises, Inc. and Hines v. J.A. LaPorte, Inc.,
the courts indicated that attorneys' fees awards do not necessarily
suffice to dissuade employers from arbitrary and unscrupulous
actions. 171
There is recent evidence suggesting that these courts were right.
In Guevara v. Maritime Overseas Corp. and Glynn v. Roy Al Boat
Management Corp., the courts excised the punitive damages penalty
from the maintenance and cure law of the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits. 172 In the wake of those decisions, some employers became
notably more resistant to maintenance and cure claims. 73 It thus
appears that the threat of punitive damages is needed to dissuade at
least a few unscrupulous employers from aggressively overreaching
unrepresented and poorly represented seamen.
"Punitive damages are meant as a threat to discourage egregious
misconduct. If the threat is well-designed, such damages should not
have to be actually awarded very often. We want the threat to
work.' 174 In the maintenance and cure context, punitive damages are
a salutary threat meant to push unscrupulous employers away from
their baser instincts, to lead callous employers away from their
tendency to be suspicious of injured seamen's claims, and to draw a
first-class lawyer to the seaman's side when abuse nevertheless
occurs. If the salutary threat had been part of the law governing the
cases set forth,175 at least some of the worst abuses shown there
171. 575 F.2d 412, 416 (2d Cir. 1978); 820 F.2d 1187, 1189 (11th Cir. 1987).
See also Vella v. Ford Motor Co., 421 U.S. 1, 4 (1975) (discussing the risk that a
shipowner might deny "vitally necessary maintenance and cure" on the "poorly
founded [belief] that the seaman's injury is permanent and incurable").
172. 59 F.3d 1496 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc), abrogated by Townsend, 129 S.
Ct. 2561; 57 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1995), abrogated by Townsend, 129 S. Ct. 2561.
173. See, e.g., Weeks Marine, Inc. v. Bowman, No. 04-0009, 2006 WL
2178514, at *2, 3-5 (E.D. La. July 28, 2006) (deploring "Weeks' consistently
unreasonable and recalcitrant conduct throughout this entire case" and stating that
Weeks' Risk Manager had "credibility problems" and that his conduct in the
matter had been "egregiously at fault," "arbitrary[,] and capricious"); Moore v.
The Sally J., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1261 (W.D. Wash. 1998) (finding that the
"defendant did not follow its own company procedures when it failed to
investigate" plaintiffs maintenance and cure claim and that defendant's refusal to
pay was "willful and persistent"); Charpentier v. Blue Streak Offshore, Inc., No.
Civ.A. 96-323, 1997 WL 426093, at *5-6, 9 (E.D. La. July 29, 1997) (detailing
lengthy course of "callous" mistreatment of seaman, causing him severe economic
dislocation and "uncertainty and prolonged mental anguish"); Spell v. Am.
Oilfield Divers, Inc., 722 So. 2d 399, 405 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1998), writ denied,
738 So. 2d 587 (La. 1999) (finding that the employer's handling of the
maintenance and cure claim was "recalcitrant" and "egregious fault" and noting
that the employer's "claims adjuster admitted that the [employer's] attorney told
him to ignore" medical information favoring the seaman's claim).
174. Robertson, supra note 1, at 162-63.
175. See Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Arms, 91 U.S. 489 (1875).
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would probably have been deterred. The seamen would have been
better protected. Expensive, protracted, and unpleasant litigation
might have been avoided.
C. Baker's Analysis of Statutory Preemption Undercuts the
Revisionist View of Miles
In Baker, defendant Exxon argued strenuously that the Clean
Water Act (CWA) 176 preempted the general maritime punitive
damages remedy. The Supreme Court unanimously rejected
Exxon's preemption argument. 77  The Court's explanation
comprised the six steps quoted below.' 78 The italicized statement
following each of the quoted steps brings the Baker reasoning to
bear on the issue of seamen's rights to seek punitive damages in
maintenance and cure cases.
(1) "Exxon . . . admit[s] that the CWA does not displace
compensatory remedies for consequences of water pollution, even
those for economic harms."'
179
Correspondingly, no one has contended that the Jones Act took
away the rights of seamen to sue for unpaid maintenance and cure
and for compensatory damages for the failure to pay maintenance
and cure.
(2) "This concession... leaves Exxon with the.., untenable
claim that the CWA somehow preempts punitive damages, but not
compensatory damages, for economic loss.I8
s
A fortiori, the argument of the Townsend petitioners that the
Jones Act somehow preempts punitive but not compensatory
damages in maintenance and cure cases was equally untenable.
(3) "But nothing in the statutory text [of the CWA] points to
fragmenting the recovery scheme this way .... ,,181
The Jones Act likewise says nothing about maintenance and
cure and nothing about punitive damages.
(4) "[A]nd we have rejected similar attempts to sever remedies
from their causes of action.
' '9 82
176. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1281 (2006).
177. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2618-19 (2008).





182. Id. (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 255-56 (1984)).
In the course of holding that federal statutes regulating nuclear safety did not
preempt a state-law action for punitive damages, the Silkwood Court stressed the
venerability of the punitive damages remedy and said that the remedy should
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In arguing that the Jones Act does not impair the maintenance
and cure cause of action but does cut into maintenance and cure
remedies, the Townsend petitioners sought precisely the kind of
severance that Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. and Baker
condemned.
(5) "All in all, we see no clear indication of congressional intent
to occupy the entire field of pollution remedies ....
There can be no serious contention that the Jones Act occupied
the entire field of seamen's remedies. The Supreme Court has stated
that "[tihe only purpose of the Jones Act was to remove the bar
created by The Osceola, so that seamen would have the same rights
to recover for negligence as other tort victims. "184 "[A] remedial
omission in the Jones Act is not evidence of considered
congressional policymaking that should command our adherence in
analogous contexts. ,185
(6) "[N]or for that matter do we perceive that punitive damages
for private harms will have any frustrating effect on the CWA
remedial scheme, which would point to preemption.' ' 8
6
The Townsend petitioners did not suggest any way in which the
Jones Act remedial scheme could be frustrated by allowing punitive
damages against employers who flout the maintenance and cure
obligation.
D. Other Aspects ofBaker Also Show that Miles Does Not Diminish
the Maritime Punitive Damages Remedy
Miles played no significant part in Baker. 87 There was no
suggestion by any member of the Baker Court that Miles impaired
subsist absent "irreconcilable conflict" with federal law or "frustrat[ion] [of] the
objectives of the federal law." Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 256.
183. Baker, 128 S. Ct. at 2619.
184. McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 342 (1991) (emphasis
added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
185. Am. Exp. Lines, Inc. v. Alvez, 446 U.S. 274, 283-84 (1980).
186. Baker, 128 S. Ct. at2619.
187. The Baker majority opinion indicated that Miles had only peripheral
relevance and did not impede the Court's authority to deal with "a perceived
defect in [the maritime] common law [punitive damages] remedy" by creating a
new ratio-based ceiling on maritime punitive damages. Baker, 128 S. Ct. at 2629-
30 & n.21. Justice Stevens' opinion-disagreeing with the new ratio-based
ceiling-said there is no "question that the Court possesses the power to craft the
rule it announces today" but that the wiser Miles-driven approach would have
heeded "that Congress has affirmatively chosen not to restrict the availability" of
the punitive damages remedy. Id. at 2638, 2635 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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or questioned the general maritime punitive damages remedy. This
further indicates that the Townsend petitioners were wrong in
claiming that Miles impedes the recovery of punitive damages in
maritime law. If Miles did have that meaning, surely some member
of the Baker Court would have said something about it.
E. The Revisionist View of Miles Is Inconsistent with All of the
Supreme Court's Jurisprudence Treating Congressional Preemption
of Federal Common Law
The Supreme Court has consistently strived to harmonize
Congress' contributions to maritime law with the underlying
maritime common law. For example, in its 2001 decision in Norfolk
Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. Garris, the Court found nothing in
the Jones Act, Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), or the
Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) that
impaired the validity of an action under maritime common law for
wrongful death damages suffered by the mother of a negligently-
killed shipyard worker. 188 Focusing on the Jones Act, the Court
cited Miles for the proposition that "even as to seamen, we have held
that general maritime law may provide wrongful-death actions
predicated on duties beyond those that the Jones Act imposes."'
189
Similarly, in The Arizona v. Anelich, the Supreme Court refused
to interpret the Jones Act in accordance with FELA decisions
applying the assumption of risk defense against workers. 19° Instead,
the Court rejected the defense, explaining that the Jones Act must
"be interpreted in harmony with the established doctrine of maritime
law of which it is an integral part."'
9 1
188. 532 U.S. 811,817-19 (2001).
189. Id. at 818.
190. 298 U.S. 110 (1936).
191. Id. at 123. See also City of Milwaukee v. Cement Div., 515 U.S. 189, 194
(1995) (holding that a statute authorizing post-judgment interest did not cast any
negative light on the general maritime law's pre-judgment interest remedy); Am.
Exp. Lines, Inc. v. Alvez, 446 U.S. 274, 282-84 (1980) (holding that nothing in
the Jones Act or DOHSA stood in the way of a general maritime action by the
wife of a harbor worker non-fatally injured aboard a ship in state territorial
waters); Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 260-63
(1979) (holding that the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA must be interpreted
consistently with the general maritime rule of joint and several liability); Mobil
Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 622 n.15, 625 (1978) (indicating that
DOHSA impairs general maritime wrongful death remedies only when the statute
"speak[s] directly to [the] question"); Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398
U.S. 375, 393-403 (1970) (determining that nothing in the Jones Act, LHWCA, or
DOHSA impeded the Court's creation of a maritime wrongful death remedy); Cox
v. Roth, 348 U.S. 207, 209 (1955) (holding that whether a Jones Act suit survives
the death of the tortfeasor should be decided under the general maritime law rather
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Outside the maritime law field, federal courts' common-law-
making authority is constrained by Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins,192 but sizeable bodies of federal common law subsist.
Here, too, there is a presumption that "where a [federal] common-
law principle is well established.. . , the courts may take it as given
that Congress has legislated with an expectation that the principle
will apply3 except 'when a statutory purpose to the contrary is
evident.'" 3
Because the Jones Act incorporates FELA, FELA cases have
almost direct bearing on seamen's cases. It is thus particularly
significant that the Supreme Court has consistently sought to
interpret FELA so as to bring it into harmony with the underlying
common law. 1
94
The governing principle in all of the foregoing cases is this:
"[s]tatutes which invade the common law or the general maritime
law are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention of long-
established and familiar principles, except when a statutory purpose
to the contrary is evident." 195 Note that in Garris, the Court had no
doubt that Miles was fully compatible with this principle. 196 The
Townsend petitioners' invitation to distort Miles into a stark outlier
from this entire body ofjurisprudence was properly declined.197
than by "literal application of the words of the F.E.L.A."); Garrett v. Moore-
McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 247-48 (1942) (holding that neither statutes
protecting seamen against unfavorable compromises of wage claims nor statutes
protecting LHWCA workers against unfavorable compromises of workers'
compensation claims impaired a general maritime doctrine protecting seamen
against unfavorable compromises of maintenance and cure and Jones Act claims);
Cortes v. Balt. Insular Line, 287 U.S. 367, 374-77 (1932) (holding that the Jones
Act does not impinge upon the rights of seamen to sue for damages for
nonpayment of maintenance and cure); Pac. S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130,
138-39 (1928) (holding that the Jones Act "was not intended to restrict in any way
the long-established right of a seaman to maintenance, cure and wages").
192. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
193. Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991).
See also United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993); Briscoe v. LaHue, 460
U.S. 325, 330 (1983); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 258
(1981); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 561 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386
U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967).
194. See, e.g., Norfolk S. Ry., Co. v. Sorrell, 549 U.S. 158, 168-69 (2007);
Monessen Sw. Ry. Co. v. Morgan, 486 U.S. 330, 337-38 (1988).
195. Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952).
196. Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. Garris, 532 U.S. 811, 818
(2001).
197. The Townsend majority relied strongly on Garris. See Atl. Sounding Co.
v. Townsend, 129 S. Ct. 2561, 2573 n.8 (2009).
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F. FELA Should Not Impair Maritime Punitive Damages
The petitioners in Townsend sought to support their argument
that Jones Act plaintiffs cannot seek punitive damages by asserting
that FELA plaintiffs cannot. The argument seems wrong for two
reasons. First, the Supreme Court has made it clear that FELA
restrictions on plaintiffs' rights cannot displace maritime law's
protections of seamen.
198
Second, on the better view of the law, FELA plaintiffs should be
able to seek punitive damages. The Senate Judiciary Committee's
Report on the 1910 amendments to FELA stated that when Congress
enacted FELA, it meant "to extend and enlarge" the workers'
remedies and not to "limit or take away ... any right theretofore
existing by which such employees were entitled to a more extended
remedy than that conferred by the Act." 199 It ought to follow that if
pre-FELA railroad workers could sue their employers for punitive
damages, FELA workers can too.
In the pre-FELA jurisprudence, railroad workers so rarely won
suits against employers that the issue of punitive damages never
came up. However, in Denver & R.G. Railway Co. v. Harris the
Supreme Court upheld a punitive damages award against a railroad
for shooting a rival railroad's worker.20 (And in Harris v. Louisville,
N.O. & TR. Co., a circuit court awarded punitive damages to a job
applicant who was accused of theft and imprisoned by the
railroad.201 So there is no reason to think that railroad workers
would not have been eligible for punitive damages in suits against
their employers had they ever managed to win a case.
Mistreated passengers were awarded punitive damages against
railroads in Milwaukee and St. Paul Railwq Co. v. Arms,202
Railroad Co. v. Brown 203 Cowens v. Winters,M4 Fell v. Northern
Pacific Railroad Co., Gallena v. Hot Springs Railroad,20 6 and
198. See Cox v. Roth, 348 U.S. 207, 209-10 (1955) (holding that decisions
holding that FELA actions did not survive the death of the tortfeasor had no
application in Jones Act cases); The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110, 119-24
(1936) (holding that an assumed risk defense then available to FELA defendants
did not apply in Jones Act cases); Cortes v. Balt. Insular Line, Inc., 287 U.S. 367,
376-77 (1932) (holding that the Jones Act imposes broader duties on employers to
care for "sick or disabled employees" than FELA).
199. 45 CONG. REc. 4048 (1910).
200. 122 U.S. 597 (1887).
201. 35F. 116 (W.D. Tenn. 1888).
202. 91 U.S. 489 (1875).
203. 84 U.S. 445 (1873).
204. 96 F. 929 (6th Cir. 1899).
205. 44 F. 248 (D.N.D. 1890).
206. 13 F. 116 (E.D. Ark. 1882).
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Brown v. Memphis & C.R. Co. 2 0 7 Moreover, railroads in pre-FELA
cases were frequently exposed to punitive damages. Lake Shore, in
supra Part V.A.2, was a punitive damages action by a mistreated
railway passenger that ultimately failed on no-vicarious-liability
grounds.
Railroads' exposure to punitive damages was not limited to
passenger-abuse cases. In Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Humes
and Minneapolis & St. L. Railway Co. v. Beckwith, the Supreme
Court upheld punitive damages awards against railroads for killing a
mule and three pigs. 209 In Philadelphia, Wilmington, & Baltimore
Railroad Co. v. Quigley, the Court said that the railroad would have
been cast with punitive damages for defaming a depot builder if
"criminal indifference to civil obligations" had been shown.21°
A 1972 A.L.R. annotation concluded that under the majority
view, FELA plaintiffs could sue for punitive damages. 
"
Authorities supporting this view include Ennis v. Yazoo & M VR.
Co., 2 12 Alabama Northern Railroad Co. v. Methvin,213 and the
federal district court's thorough and careful opinion in Kozar v.
Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Co.214 Kozar was reversed by the
Sixth Circuit,215 and that opinion is the shaky foundation of the
proposition that FELA plaintiffs cannot seek punitive damages. The
Sixth Circuit's Kozar opinion is extremely implausible in two
respects. First, it sidesteps FELA's legislative history by claiming
that punitive damages are not a "remedy. ' 216 Second, it performs a
feat of judicial legerdemain on the Vreeland line of cases, flipping
the pecuniary-loss limitation on wrongful death damages into a
broad new rule that all "damages recoverable under [FELA] are
compensatory only."
217
G. Seamen Need and Deserve the Protection of Punitive Damages
As the Court explained in Baker, punitive damages are justified
to punish reprehensible conduct and to teach the defendant not to do
207. 7 F. 51 (W.D. Tenn. 1881).
208. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 115-17 (1893).
209. 115 U.S. 512 (1885); 129 U.S. 26 (1889).
210. 62 U.S. 202, 214 (1858).
211. William E. Aiken, Jr., Annotation, Recovery of Punitive Damages in
Actions Under Jones Act or Federal Employers' Liability Act, 10 A.L.R, FED. 511,
§ 2[a] (1972).
212. 79 So. 73 (Miss. 1918).
213. 64 So. 175 (Ala. Ct. App. 1913).
214. 320 F. Supp. 335 (W.D. Mich. 1970).
215. Kozar v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 449 F.2d 1238 (6th Cir. 1971).
216. Id. at 1240.
217. Id. at 1241 (emphasis added).
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it again and others not to do it at all.21 8 Exxon was subjected to
punitive damages in Baker because its conduct created a
reprehensible threat to marine safety. Seamen are uniquely
vulnerable to such threats; that is why they have the special
protections that federal maritime law has always afforded them.21 9 If
seamen had been injured in the Exxon Valdez accident, they would
have needed and deserved the punitive damages remedy, at least as
much so as any other marine interest.
VII. THE TOWNSEND OPINIONS
Justice Thomas' majority opinion in Townsend was joined by
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. 220 The opinion's
analysis of the case is notably clear and straightforward, making the
following key points:
o[P]rior to enactment of the Jones Act in 1920, "maritime
jurisprudence was replete with judicial statements
approving punitive damaes, especially on behalf of
passengers and seamen."
2
*Nothing in maritime law undermines the applicability of
this general rule in the maintenance and cure
context.222
*The Jones Act... created a statutory cause of action for
negligence, but it did not eliminate pre-existing
remedies available to seamen for the separate
common-law cause of action based on a seaman's
right to maintenance and cure.223 . . . [Vaughan]
supports the view that punitive damages awards, in
particular, remain available in maintenance and cure
actions after the [Jones] Act's passage. 224
-Miles does not address either maintenance and cure
actions in general or the availability of punitive
damages for such actions.225 . . .Miles does not
require us to eliminate the general maritime remedy of
punitive damages for the willful or wanton failure to
218. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2621 (2008).
219. See Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 354 (1995).
220. At. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 129 S. Ct. 2561, 2565 (2009).
221. Id. at 2568 (quoting Robertson, supra note 1, at 115).
222. Id.
223. Id. at 2570.
224. Id. at 2571.
225. Id. at 2572.
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comply with the duty to pay maintenance and cure.226
• . .Limiting recovery for maintenance and cure to
whatever is permitted by the Jones Act would give
greater pre-emptive effect to the Act than is required
by its text, Miles, or any of this Court's other
decisions interpreting the statute.227
Justice Alito's dissenting opinion was joined by Chief Justiced228 I
Roberts and Justices Scalia and Kennedy. It, too, is clear and
straightforward, resting on three arguments:
*It is ... reasonable to assume that only compensatory
[and not punitive] damages may be recovered under
the Jones Act.229
-Endorsing what has been termed a principle of
uniformity, Miles teaches that if a form of relief is not
available on a [Jones Act] claim, we should be
reluctant to permit such relief on a similar claim
brought under general maritime law.
230
e[T]he search for [pre-Jones Act] maintenance and cure
cases in which punitive damages were awarded yields
strikingly slim results. The cases found are
insufficient in number, clarity, and prominence to
justify departure from the Miles uniformity
principle.
VIII. OPEN QUESTIONS
In important footnotes, the Townsend majority flagged two open
questions. First, the Court did "not address the dissent's argument that
the Jones Act ...prohibits the recovery of punitive damages in
actions under that statute."232 This will doubtless be the earliest and
most hotly contested of the new issues that Townsend has opened up.
Second, the Court expressly did not decide whether punitive
damages in maintenance and cure cases are subject to the Baker
ceiling (a one-to-one ratio to compensatory damages).23 3 Plaintiffs'
arguments against the applicability of the ceiling will probably point
226. Id. at 2573.
227. Id. at 2575.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 2577 (Alito, J., dissenting).
230. Id. at 2576.
231. Id. at 2579.
232. Id. at 2575 n.12.
233. Seeid. atn.11.
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to suggestions in Baker that the ceiling might be inapplicable to
"dangerous activity carried on for the purpose of increasing a
tortfeasor's financial gain... [i.e.] strategic financial wrongdoing' ' 234
to "cases with ... earmarks of exceptional blameworthiness;" ' to
cases of "modest economic harm or odds of detection;' '236 and to
cases in which "the value of injury and the corresponding
compensatory award are small (providing low incentives to sue).9237
Other open questions in the tort realm include the availability of
punitive damages in unseaworthiness actions, in personal injury
actions by seamen against non-employer-non-shipowner defendants
(e.g., products liability actions), and in personal injury actions
generally.
In the maintenance and cure area, some might contend that
whether attorneys' fees remain an available remedy against an
employer who has refused to provide maintenance or cure has
become an open question. However, it should be noted that the
Townsend Court strongly endorsed Vaughan, which squarely
supported the attorneys' fees remedy.238 Assuming that the
attorneys' fees remedy remains viable, there is probably room for
litigation as to what the standard of blameworthiness should now be.
IX. CONCLUSION
The biggest question of all is what the lower courts will make of
Townsend. On the face of things, the situation seems clear: punitive
damages can be awarded for seriously blameworthy violations of the
maintenance and cure obligation, and the Fifth Circuit, Ninth
Circuit, and other circuit courts that held to the contrary have been
wrong. But circuit-level judges with maritime expertise are not
always eager to accept new guidance from the Supreme Court,23 9
and no one who has worked in this field for very long will be much
surprised if the immediate aftermath of Townsend is hotly litigious.
234. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2631 n.24 (2008).
235. Id. at 2633.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 2622.
238. See Townsend, 129 S. Ct. at 2571.
239. See, e.g., David W. Robertson & Michael F. Sturley, Recent
Developments in Admiralty and Maritime Law at the National Level and in the
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, 33 TUL. MAR. L.J. 381,469 (2009) (discussing Cain v.
Transocean Offshore USA, Inc., 518 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 2008)); David W.
Robertson & Michael F. Sturley, Recent Developments in Admiralty and Maritime
Law at the National Level and in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, 31 TUL. MAR.
L.J. 463, 573-75 (2007) (discussing Holmes v. At. Sounding Co., 437 F.3d 441
(5th Cir. 2006)).
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